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When we talk about football, we usually think first of the NFL. When you look at the global numbers, this figure nearly doubles. InSuper Bowl XLIX only generated about 10, more bets than the most heavily bet college football game:compared to ,

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Indian cricket betting scandal deepens a waterway

As a result, the search party concluded that the little boy somehow ended up in the cold water of the Atlantic Ocean or that he was abducted from the beach by someone who picked him up and carried him away. Member of the community, however, stated that they are still full of hope to find the little boy alive. Missing Mandela mystery deepens Posted by Daniel Terblanche.

Date: Jan 05, Breaking News. Pictured: Spencer Mandela Nakale. Photo: File. Now that India recognizes the folly of relying on China for critical supplies, this is bound to change. Fortunately, regional powers — beginning with India — are pushing back. With this regional resistance increasingly supported by the US and other Western powers, Xi will most likely live to regret the decisions he made in Brahma Chellaney, The Times of India.

It mandates sanctions against Chinese officials interfering in such processes. India already received a wake-up call in April-May when China stealthily grabbed key vantage points in Ladakh and then claimed, as in the Galwan Valley case, that they were historically part of Tibet. Tibet is clearly at the centr e of the China-India divide. And TPSA holds special significance for India, which gave refuge to the Dalai Lama and his followers, helped preserve the Tibetan language and culture, and kept the spirit of Tibetan independence alive.

On Aug. Today, China is claiming Indian areas on the basis of not any Han-Chinese connection to them but alleged Tibetan ecclesial or tutelary links. China has no legal standing to press India for compliance when its actions have knowingly gutted the accord, rendering it invalid in international law. While the Tibetans pray for the long life of the present Dalai Lama, Xi is waiting impatiently for him to die so that he can install a puppet as his successor, in the way China has captured the Panchen Lama institution.

To frustrate his plan, India should tacitly help Tibetan exiles find, appoint and protect his successor. India must get its act together to help advance its interests. India could appoint a special emissary on Tibet by stating that, although Tibet has ceased to be a political buffer with China, it should become a political bridge between the two countries. By cautiously recalibrating its Tibet policy, India can help elevate Tibet as an international strategic and environmental issue.

Brahma Chellaney , The National. Researchers believe that the impact of the pandemic has set in motion higher rates of birth, divorce, obesity, depression, bankruptcy, unemployment and domestic violence, among other things. But one key implication of the pandemic has received little attention: increasing demand for safe water. Freshwater is not just the basis of cleanliness; it is an indispensable weapon in combating Covid or any other disease. More fundamentally, water is essential for economic growth and social stability.

Even before the pandemic flared, our water crisis was becoming more acute. Most striking is how unevenly and unequally water resources are distributed across the world. Some countries, notably Canada and Russia, are endowed with copious water resources. The poorest states in water resources, by contrast, are largely located in Middle East and North Africa. Natural water availability in these countries is just a fraction of 1 per cent of the per capita resources in, say, water-rich Brazil.

Water scarcity, already affecting two-thirds of the global population, is set is grow due to several factors. These include over-exploitation of the resources of rivers, aquifers and lakes; rising demands of economic development; changing diets, especially the increasing intake of meat, whose production is notoriously water-intensive; and global warming.

National paucity of water resources is driving some countries or companies to produce food for their home markets on overseas farmland, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Riparian neighbours are increasingly competing to appropriate resources of shared rivers and aquifers by building hydro-engineering structures, which are exacerbating the environmental impact. A report reflecting the joint judgment of US intelligence agencies warned in that the use of water as a weapon or a tool of terrorism will become more likely in some regions, with some countries using shared water resources to exert leverage over their neighbours and to secure regional influence.

Since then, the water situation has become more dire and the hydropolitics murkier. Another trend is the increasing commodification of water, as reflected in the dramatic rise of the bottled-water industry. And second, bottled mineral water is already more precious than crude oil.

The current international spot price of crude oil is lower than the retail price of any mineral water in a convenience store or supermarket. Yet more and more people are relying on bottled water even in cities in the developed world where tap water is safe and highly regulated.

The pandemic, though, may have helped raise global awareness about the centrality of water in our lives. But the pandemic has also underlined the challenge: how to meet the increasing demand for water? Scientific advancements have substantially improved the energy-water ratio of such technologies, thus increasing the commercial feasibility and attraction of utilising new supply sources.

The sharpening hydropolitics, meanwhile, represents a formidable challenge. There is no alternative to rules-based co-operation on shared water resources. Transparency on national projects, collaboration between co-riparian states on trans-boundary aquifers, rivers and lakes, sharing arrangements, and dispute-settlement mechanisms are the building blocks of water peace. The consequences have been serious.

Meanwhile, in largely arid Central Asia, China has diverted waters from the Illy and Irtysh rivers, which originate in China-annexed Xinjiang. With the Brahmaputra megaproject, China has provided an answer.

China will achieve this by harnessing the power of a 2,meter 3,yard drop just before the river crosses into India. But the megaproject in the Brahmaputra Canyon region will enable the country to manipulate transboundary flows far more effectively. In fact, the canyon region is sacred territory for Tibetans: its major mountains, cliffs, and caves represent the body of their guardian deity, the goddess Dorje Pagmo, and the Brahmaputra represents her spine.

If none of this deters China, the damage it is doing to its own people and prospects should. If the Brahmaputra mega-dam collapses — hardly implausible, given that it will be built in a seismically active area — millions downstream could die. Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe this will happen.

On the contrary, as long as the Communist Party of China remains in power, the country will most likely continue to wage stealthy water wars that no one can win. Brahma Chellaney, The Japan Times. President-elect Joe Biden has been wrong on China almost his entire career. Will he finally get it right after being sworn in as president? It is no exaggeration to say that international policy toward China has for decades been shaped largely by one power — the United States.

And other countries followed the American lead in outsourcing manufacturing to China and building closer bonds with that communist giant. In a major speech on China in July , U. Trump himself has acknowledged that the U. The U. The year will be remembered for the China-inspired COVID shock, with the dictatorship in Beijing seeking to capitalize on the pandemic. Consequently, negative views of China have reached historic highs in many countries, according to a recent survey.

Biden is assuming office at a time when an international pushback against China is clearly emerging. A number of important economies are now seeking a managed and selective decoupling from China in key areas. But if Biden proves a weak president, the pushback will ease — and the decoupling will slow. Could Biden return to the softer approach toward China of the Obama period?

The same model Xi is now seeking to replicate in the East China Sea and the Himalayas, where China remains locked in a military standoff with India since May after encroaching on some Indian border areas. Both concepts imply a G2-style condominium. But make no mistake: A U. But, in apparent deference to China, the Biden office readout left out that assurance.

In another worrying sign, Steve Ricchetti, who led the effort 21 years ago to get China into the WTO an entry that has come back to haunt the U. In an interview this month, Biden surprisingly claimed that the U. Such delay in crafting a strategy could help relieve pressure on Beijing.

Such an approach will militate against the current U. There is an additional factor that could constrain Biden from going soft on China — a lingering scandal involving his controversial son, Hunter. Hunter personally made millions of dollars from the deal. Republicans could resurrect that scandal to embarrass Biden. China has long used U. Wall Street remains its powerful ally. China also has another ally in Washington — those who remain mired in Cold War thinking and see Russia as the main foe.

Without U. This is why Biden must at the earliest provide strategic clarity to his China approach. Brahma Chellaney, a longtime contributor to The Japan Times, is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including, most recently, Water, Peace, and War. In a major speech on China in July, U. Now, people of good faith can debate why free nations allowed these bad things to happen for all these years.

And President Trump has said: enough. I blame all of our presidents, and not just President Obama. You go back a long way. You look at President Clinton, Bush — everybody; they allowed this to happen, they created a monster. Chinese territorial aggression in the Himalayas has been a huge boon for American efforts to win over India, as highlighted by a recent agreement to share geospatial data from airborne and satellite sensors.

After establishing an Indo-Pacific strategy and resurrecting the Quad, which had been lying dormant for nine years, the Trump administration — in a symbolic nod toward India — renamed the U. In the recent words of U. As the U. Will the administration of Joe Biden return to the softer approach toward China of the Obama period? The same model China has sought to replicate in the Himalayas, by incrementally encroaching on the territories of India, Nepal and Bhutan. That strategy has relied on the Quad.

Under Biden, the fundamental direction of the U. But Biden could reset ties with China in order to lower Sino-U. The open support the U. For example, after the Galwan Valley clashes of mid-June, U. They beat 20 Indians to death. They beat them so badly with clubs with nails in them and wrapped with concertina wire — barbed wire.

They beat the Indians so badly that they were disfigured and could not be identified by their comrades. The Chinese have been very aggressive with India. I think you need to put it in the larger context. Claims that they have now made for real estate in Bhutan, the incursions that took place in India, these are indicative of Chinese intentions. And they are testing, they are probing the world to see if we are going to stand up to their threats and their bullying. Such plain speaking may become a thing of the past.

That divide obscures a course between these extremes — one that is not premised on Chinese capitulation or on U. Both concepts imply a G2-style condominium defined by competitive-cum-cooperative elements. This is a country increasingly oriented to the primacy of the Communist Party. What is remarkable — and a cause for deep concern — is that Biden has been wrong on China virtually his entire career. But just when a concert of democracies in the Indo-Pacific seems closer than ever, the impending change of U.

Rarely has the U. After the U. Today, a rules-based and democracy-led order in the Indo-Pacific has become more important than ever to ensure a stable power balance. It will also lead to questions about the inherent unpredictability surrounding U. Nowhere will these questions generate greater concerns than in India, which hosted the recent Malabar war games.

More broadly, it could be viewed as a possible dilution of the U. But India now faces new uncertainties with regard to U. Few know what Biden stands for. Biden, who turned 78 last month, will be the oldest ever American president sworn in for the first time. Biden won the election despite having no political base or vision — and no ideas, other than to oust Trump from office.

Today, the U. If as president, Biden seeks to mend U. India, however, is likely to remain important for the U. This geopolitical reality, if left unaddressed, could crimp U. Negative views of China have now reached historic highs in many countries, according to a survey by the Washington-based Pew Research Center. If Biden proves a weak president, the pushback will certainly ease — and the decoupling could slow.

Such an approach will militate against the current bipartisan consensus on China in the U. Kennan the founding director of its Policy Planning Staff that helped institute the containment policy against the Soviet Union — a policy that defined the Cold War era. It specifies a multipronged approach to address the China challenge. For New Delhi, the key concern extends beyond the bilateral relationship with Washington — a relationship that is likely to remain close.

Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including, most recently, Water, Peace, and War. In a world wracked by violence, Islamist beheadings stand out for their savagery. In a world wracked by violence, such killings stand out for their savagery. While the absolute number of victims is relatively small, the threat this practice poses to fundamental principles of modern civilization should not be underestimated. Such savagery casts a long shadow — especially because perpetrators so often share images of their actions.

The gruesome spectacle inspires jihadi sympathizers around the world, while fomenting fear in local communities, to the point that the Islamists are often able to impose their will — including medieval codes of conduct — on the societies in which they operate. But, by making clear their willingness to behave inhumanely, they have ensured that few dare defy them. Through such tactics, Islamists are gradually snuffing out more liberal, diverse Islamic traditions in non-Arab countries.

Although beheadings have a particularly visceral impact, they are far from the only way the jihadists incite fear. Even within Western countries, meaningful government action against Islamist extremism has often been stymied by concerns about discrimination. In the last few years, China has incarcerated more than one million Uighurs and members of other Muslim minorities in its western Xinjiang region.

It is clearly far easier to attack a democracy than to stand up to a ruthless dictatorship. But none of this will protect Muslim communities, let alone end Islamist terrorism. For that, governments must adopt a new approach, based on a better understanding of the enemy they are fighting.

Islamist extremism is not an organization or an army; it is an ideological movement. That is why eliminating high-level figures in ISIS or al-Qaeda does so little to stop the bloodshed, and why military action alone will always fall short. It also means taming the clerics and other preachers of violent jihad. Otherwise, the war on terror will continue to rage, and violent Islamism will become more deeply entrenched in societies. Brahma Chellaney , Nikkei Asia.

The current naval war games involving Australia, India, Japan and the U. A concert of democracies in the Indo-Pacific seems closer than ever. But just when the four powers appear on the cusp of formalizing their coalition, the impending change in the White House has added a layer of uncertainty. Trump fundamentally changed U. Nowhere will these questions generate greater concerns than in India, the host of the current Quad naval war games up to Nov.

Handout photo from U. Chinese territorial aggression in the Himalayas has helped bring India along. This would mark a break with the current approach that sees the U. To be sure, Biden made a habit during the election campaign of reversing his positions on major policy issues.

Flip-flops are to Biden what egomania is to Trump. And, in apparent deference to Beijing, the Biden office readout left out the assurance Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga said he received from the president-elect that U. The bipartisan consensus in Washington that the U.

Unless a clearer strategic vision emerges under Biden, the likely unraveling of the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy could silence any hoped-for regional concert of democracies. Foreign Affairs journal. President-elect Joe Biden will inherit a U.

Will the bilateral relationship continue to deepen under the next U. In the past decade, Washington and New Delhi have deepened their diplomatic and defense ties, but the Indian government has not yet officially allied with the United States. During the administration of U. President Donald Trump, India and the United States signed a series of foundational defense, logistics, and intelligence-sharing agreements that pave the way for close security cooperation.

Last month, the then U. As the specter of additional Himalayan battles—or even a reprise of the border war with China—looms large, India has grown more willing to work with the United States to meet common challenges.

Biden is likely to continue to push for closer cooperation between New Delhi and Washington. Beijing seized key stretches of territory and has refused to pull back, alarming both Indian policymakers and the public at large. Given these tensions, Biden will have to thread a diplomatic needle to improve relations with China without alienating India.

Successive U. New Delhi would be disappointed if Biden, in seeking to mend U. India has traditionally resented such interference in and commentary on its internal affairs. Congress last December after it emerged that Representative Pramila Jayapal, an outspoken critic of the Modi government, would attend. Such differences have the potential to set back U. The incoming president, more broadly, is likely to pursue a pragmatic policy aimed at containing the threats posed by both the Chinese Communist Party and violent Islamist extremists.

Current U. In that context, the strengthening bond with India assumes greater meaning for U. Even as he tries to lower tensions with China, Biden must be careful not to allow the historic opportunity to forge a U. Sri Lanka and Pakistan, meanwhile, are taking fresh loans from China to pay off old loans, highlighting the vicious cycle in which they find themselves trapped.

Both have already been compelled to cede strategic assets to China. Pakistan has given China exclusive rights, coupled with a tax holiday, to run Gwadar port for the next 40 years. Next to the port, which is located at the crossroads of the global energy trade, China plans to build a Djibouti-style outpost for its navy. Tajikistan, whose borrowing binge from was followed by its ceding of 1, sq.

Another country heavily in debt to China, neighboring Kyrgyzstan, also sought relief from Beijing last month before it plunged into political chaos. In Africa, a long list of states wanting suspension of their debt repayments to Beijing during the coronavirus pandemic includes Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique and Zambia.

So, it agreed to give deep-pocketed Chinese state-run companies an important role in harnessing its rich hydropower reserves. The answer is several factors, including the comparative ease of borrowing from China, with IMF lending normally carrying stringent conditions and oversight. Indeed, China is happy to lend until nations face a debt crisis because of the greater leverage it gives Beijing.

Typically, China starts as an economic partner of another country, only to gradually become its economic master. China has a record of exploiting the vulnerability of small, strategically located countries that borrow big. One such example is the Maldives, where Beijing converted big credits into political influence, including acquiring a couple of islets cheaply in that Indian Ocean archipelago. Unlike some other heavily indebted states, the Maldives has been lucky to escape a Chinese debt trap.

But the wider pushback against its imperial overreach, coupled with the corruption and malpractice in many of its Belt and Road projects, suggests that Beijing could be securing near-term advantages at the expense of its long-term goals. Negative views of China have reached historic highs this year. The rising public distrust of China even in partner countries, and the fact that many Belt and Road projects are still not financially viable, have resulted in a declining number of new projects.

Cumulatively, China is likely to pay a high price for its debt-trap diplomacy, even as the states it has ensnared are bound to suffer. Brahma Chellaney , Project Syndicate. China represents a growing challenge to all these principles. While all of the Quad partners agree in principle on the need for a free and open Indo-Pacific, it is Chinese expansionism that has catalyzed their recent actions.

China is forcing even distant powers like the United Kingdom, France, and Germany to view a rules-based Indo-Pacific as central to international peace and security. These developments suggest that in the coming years, Quad members will increasingly work with European partners to establish a strategic constellation of democracies capable of providing stability and an equilibrium of power in the Indo-Pacific. After lying dormant for nine years, the Quad was resurrected in late , but really only gained momentum over the last year, when its consultations were elevated to the foreign-minister level.

Australia and Japan are both under the US security and nuclear umbrella, whereas India not only shares a large land border with China, but also must confront Chinese territorial aggression on its own, as it is currently doing. It is precisely this aggression that has changed the strategic equation.

It is now more likely than ever that the Quad will shift gears from consultation and coordination to become a de facto strategic alliance that plays a central role in a new multilateral security arrangement for the region. Most likely, this meeting will conclude with India signing on to the last of the four foundational agreements that the US maintains with its other close defense partners.

US foreign policy has always been most effective when it leverages cooperation with other countries to advance shared strategic objectives. But that day is coming. The Quad once merely symbolized an emerging international effort to establish a discreet check on Chinese power. The extended standoff has certainly raised the risks of further localized battles or another full-scale border war.

The Tibetan frontier with India was largely peaceful for centuries before China occupied Tibet in Under Xi, China has introduced measures to snuff out Tibetan culture and cut Tibetans off from ancient traditions, including herding and farming. Recent reports have shed light on a coerced labor program to forcibly assimilate Tibetans, including through military drill-style skills training. China has also forced the last remaining Tibetan-language school to teach in Chinese.

India, however, has been funding Tibetan-language schools for its large Tibetan refugee community. Tibetan children study at a school in the northern Indian hill town of Dharamsala. Underscoring the sharpening geopolitics, the U. This explains why China has intensified its claim to Tawang, the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama.

Even more humiliating for Beijing is the fact that the Indian operation was spearheaded by a special force made up entirely of Tibetan exiles. India rubbed salt in the wound by holding a largely-attended military funeral for a Tibetan soldier killed in that operation, with his coffin draped in both the Indian and Tibetan national flags. The itch to fight the occupiers of their homeland has drawn Tibetan recruits to this force. But his aggression against India may not be progressing as planned.

China, however, is unwilling to curb its economic and territorial expansionism. In fact, Xi continues to push the boundaries, as underscored by the multiple fronts he has opened simultaneously, including in the East and South China seas, the Himalayan frontier, Hong Kong and Taiwan. We have no intention to fight either a cold war or a hot war with any country.

We will continue to narrow differences and resolve disputes with others through dialogue and negotiation. There are important parallels between the way China is pursuing its territorial revisionism against its two main rivals in Asia, Japan and India. Indeed, China is pursuing a strategy of attrition and containment against both. In international law, a territorial claim must be based on continuous and peaceful exercise of sovereignty over the territory concerned. There is absolutely no evidence that China ever had effective control over, for example, the Senkaku Islands.

Sinicizing the names of territories it claims is an old tactic of the Chinese Communist Party. In recent months, China has sought to even police the waters off the Senkakus. If history is not to be repeated, Suga should draw some lessons, including from the record of his predecessor, Shinzo Abe. Consider the startling fact that no Japanese defense minister has ever conducted an aerial survey of the Senkakus. Such shrinking from purely defensive action explains why an emboldened China has stepped up incursions.

Japan needs to strengthen its administrative and security control over the Senkakus. This approach involves taking an adversary by surprise, including seizing an opportunistic timing, and camouflaging offense as defense. China persists with its recklessly provocative actions, including ignoring the risk that an incident could spiral out of control. A fourth lesson is that as long as China perceives strategic benefits as outweighing costs, Xi will persist with his strategy of attrition against Japan.

Against this background, a Chinese strike against the Senkaku Islands could conceivably come when Japan has been lulled into complacency and least expects an attack. This is what happened to India. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not see the Chinese aggression coming because his vision had been clouded by the naive hope that, by meeting Xi 18 times in about five years, he had reset the bilateral relationship.

Despite the Suga-Xi understanding, Chinese provocations could escalate. Japan has spent years being on the defensive, allowing China to keep the initiative. Japan ought to look at ways to impose costs. This could include first warning Beijing that its provocative actions, such as chasing Japanese fishing vessels within Japanese territorial waters, would henceforth be firmly countered.

If provocative actions persist despite the warning, the Japan Coast Guard could selectively act against some intruding Chinese state ships. To be sure, effectively countering Chinese incursions demands more than ramming or disabling intruding ships and detaining their crews. Japan could begin modestly by building an environmental monitoring station in the Senkakus. China, of course, will react furiously to any Japanese counteractions.

If not, China will bring Japanese security under increasing pressure in the coming years. Japan has a strong case, anchored in international law, that it has exercised sovereignty over the Senkakus since But make no mistake: The future of the Senkakus will not be decided by international law, even though a just, rules-based order is essential for international peace and security.

The South China Sea is a reminder that international law is powerless against the powerful. Japan undoubtedly faces hard choices. But accommodation with an unyielding China is simply not possible. To stop its security from coming under siege, Japan must act — with calm, confidence and firmness. But by provoking India, he may have bitten off more than he can chew. Xi, who in some ways has taken up the expansionist mantle of Mao Zedong, is attempting to implement a modern version of the tributary system that Chinese emperors used to establish authority over vassal states: submit to the emperor, and reap the benefits of peace and trade with the empire.

The specter of international isolation and supply disruptions now looms over China, spurring Xi to announce plans to hoard mammoth quantities of mineral resources and agricultural products. India, however, is ready to fight. Xi was so embarrassed by this outcome that, whereas India honored its 20 fallen as martyrs, China refuses to admit its precise death toll.

The truth is that, without the element of surprise, China is not equipped to dominate India in a military confrontation. And India is making sure that it will not be caught off guard again. It has now matched Chinese military deployments along the Himalayan frontier and activated its entire logistics network to transport the supplies needed to sustain the troops and equipment through the coming harsh winter.

In another blow to China, Indian special forces recently occupied strategic mountain positions overlooking key Chinese deployments on the southern side of Pangong Lake. If that were not humiliating enough for China, India eagerly noted that the Special Frontier Force that spearheaded the operation comprises Tibetan refugees. The Tibetan soldier who was killed by a landmine in the operation was honored with a well-attended military funeral.

If China is merely occupying Tibet, how can it claim sovereignty over those borderlands? Xi wants neither to back down nor to wage an open war, which is unlikely to yield the decisive victory he needs to restore his reputation after the border debacle. Given this, a Sino-Indian war in the Himalayas would probably end in a stalemate, with both sides suffering heavy losses. Xi seems to be hoping that he can simply wear India down. At a time when the Indian economy has registered its worst-ever contraction due to the still-escalating COVID crisis, Xi has forced India to divert an increasing share of resources to national defense.

But it seems less likely that India will wilt under Chinese pressure than that Xi will leave behind a legacy of costly blunders. With his Himalayan misadventure, Xi has provoked a powerful adversary and boxed himself into a corner. Those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it. Did India really draw enduring lessons from ? Brahma Chellaney, The Hindustan Times.

Successive Indian governments have put more faith in diplomacy than the armed forces in achieving security objectives. Diplomacy can accomplish little in the absence of strategic vision and resolve or adequate leverage. Worse still, India has learned little from its past, which explains why history repeats itself.

Why has India repeatedly cried betrayal, not by friends, but by adversaries in whom it reposed trust? Why has Indian diplomacy, time after time, rushed to believe what it wanted to believe? Or what makes India keep repeating the cycle of bending over backward to court a foe and then failing to see aggression coming as in Kargil, Pathankot or Doklam?

One reason history repeats itself is that virtually every Indian prime minister, although unschooled in national security at the time of assuming office, has sought to reinvent the foreign-policy wheel, rather than learn from past blunders. Another reason is that Indian intellectuals and journalists generally shrink from closely scrutinizing foreign-policy moves. Now India admits China has trashed all those agreements with its aggression. For Beijing, any agreement is designed to bind not China but the other side to its terms.

It is seeking fresh CBMs to make India respect the new, Chinese-created territorial status quo and to restrict India from upgrading its border infrastructure. It reined in its armed forces from taking counteractions until recently. China used the talks with India to make additional encroachments, especially on the critical Depsang Y-Junction, which controls access to several areas. Of all the land grabs China has made, the largest is in Depsang, the sector of utmost importance to Indian defences.

Yet this encroachment has received little attention. In fact, some are drawing a false equivalence between the Chinese and Indian military actions to obscure the reality. While China has seized several areas that traditionally were under Indian patrolling jurisdiction, India has occupied its own unmanned mountain heights in one area in order to pre-empt another Chinese land grab.

All the boundary-related bilateral accords and protocols are LAC-centred. But China, signalling its aggressive designs, stopped referring to the term LAC in recent years. Instead it is quietly treating the LAC as a line to actually control by changing facts on the ground. In this light, diplomacy is unlikely to deliver the status quo ante India seeks. In fact, China seems intent on continuing, below the threshold of armed conflict, coercive military pressure along the entire frontier from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh until India acquiesces to its demands, including reconciling to the new status quo.

Beijing has nurtured long-standing ties with the Taliban to help Pakistan call the shots in Afghanistan. Brahma Chellaney , Nikkei Asian Review. Trump, calling the U. Yet China has nurtured long-standing ties with the Taliban — created and armed by Pakistani intelligence — to help Pakistan call the shots in Afghanistan. Pakistan, which Beijing considers its client-state, has helped facilitate Chinese-Taliban ties. Such long-standing ties with the Taliban, and a strong strategic nexus with Pakistan, have helped China avert any major terrorist strike on its projects in Afghanistan, including the large Aynak copper mine it secured in By contrast, Indian infrastructure projects and diplomatic missions in Afghanistan have repeatedly come under terrorist attack.

Beijing wants to safeguard its heavy investment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the supposed crown jewel of its Belt and Road Initiative. It also wants to ensure the Taliban do not aid Uighur militants. The fact that no counterterrorism campaign has ever succeeded when the militants have enjoyed cross-border havens compelled the Trump administration to sue for peace in order to end the longest war in U. Less known is that China also played a part in the peace effort by encouraging the Taliban to enter into a deal with the U.

Indeed, even before Trump took office, Beijing offered to mediate and help revive the stalled talks between the U. In return, the U. Since then, relations between Beijing and Washington have deteriorated to a point approaching a new Cold War. Making matters worse, the U. Hopes of a U. Against this background, China, despite its ties with the Taliban, is likely to find it difficult to advance its interests in the Afghanistan-Pakistan belt.

Irrespective of the outcome of the U. However, the spectre of further troop clashes or a style Himalayan war continues to loom, despite continuing bilateral efforts to disengage rival forces. Deception and surprise are integral to the Chinese strategy, even in peacetime. The aggression in Ladakh came just six months after Mr. Xi in one key aspect. Since Mr. This summer, Mr.

The move thus sought to advance Mr. Against this background, Mr. The Chinese encroachments have led to multiple rounds of clashes with Indian troops in Ladakh. The deadliest occurred on June 15, leaving 20 Indian soldiers, and an unknown number of Chinese troops, dead. While India honoured its fallen as martyrs, China still refuses to divulge its losses.

As long as Mr. Xi, like Mao, perceives the strategic benefits as outweighing the international costs, he will persist with his campaign of expansionism. Xi is likely to end up pushing that country closer to the United States and creating an adversarial bloc around China. Already, international attitudes toward Mr. As long as the costs of expansionism remain manageable, Chinese President Xi Jinping will stay the course, seeking to exploit electoral politics and polarization in major democracies.

Historians will most likely view as a watershed year. Moreover, the so-called Quad — comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the US — seems poised to deepen its strategic collaboration. This represents a notable shift for India, in particular, which has spent years attempting to appease China.

Australia withdrew from the exercise in when it involved only the US and India. Not anymore. With Australia again involved in Malabar, the Quad grouping will have a formal, practical platform for naval drills. Already, cooperation among Quad members is gaining some strategic heft. India has a similar pact with the US and is set to sign one with Japan shortly. The next logical step would be for these countries to play a more concerted, coordinated role in advancing broader regional security.

The problem is that American, Australian, Indian, and Japanese security interests are not entirely congruent. Moreover, India is the only Quad member that maintains a land-based defense posture, and it faces the very real prospect of a serious conflict with China on its Himalayan border. Australia, meanwhile, must engage in a delicate balancing act. If China continues pursuing an expansionist strategy, however, such hedging will no longer be justifiable.

As long as the costs of expansionism remain manageable, Xi will stay the course, seeking to exploit electoral politics and polarization in major democracies. Their vision must be clarified and translated into a well-defined policy approach, backed with real strategic weight.

Otherwise, Xi will continue to use brute force to destabilize the Indo-Pacific further, possibly even starting a war. Along with the spread of the Wuhan-originating coronavirus, this has also given rise to growing anti-China sentiment. That strategy, centered on winning without fighting, has driven its bullet-less aggressions, from seizing Johnson Reef in and Mischief Reef in , to occupying the Scarborough Shoal in Deception and surprise are integral to the Chinese strategy even in peacetime.

China intruded into areas located even beyond its own artificially drawn claim lines that it has published in the past. Beijing has repeatedly shown that it can make a new territorial claim or disturb the status quo anywhere at any time. Xi has sought to take off from where Mao left. As long as Xi perceives the strategic benefits as outweighing the international costs, he will persist with his campaign of expansionism.

But he is already sowing the seeds of an international backlash. By occupying key vantage points in eastern Ladakh in an operation backed by tens of thousands of troops in the rear, China has entered a dangerous new phase in its territorial expansionism. In fact, China intruded into areas located beyond any claim line it has ever published, including its , and claim lines in Ladakh. China seems determined to hold on to its territorial gains, which explains its statement that disengagement is mostly over.

Indeed, it has used military and diplomatic talks to demand Indian acquiescence in the new status quo. The protracted talks have also helped it to consolidate its hold on the land grabs, including by building fortifications and installing fibre optic cables.

China has achieved its territorial gains in the same way it made territorial grabs elsewhere in Asia since the s — below the threshold of armed conflict, without firing a shot. Believing time is on its side, China is seeking to wear India out in order to present a fait accompli. The longer India has waited, the harder it has become to militarily push back the intruding Chinese forces and restore status quo ante.

Indian efforts to obscure the intrusions and troop clashes only led to newer Chinese encroachments. India now faces crunch time. Imposing significant economic and diplomatic costs, coupled with the application of coercive military pressure, holds the key. India must speak from a position of strength.

Its professional, battle-hardened armed forces, coupled with its trade and diplomatic leverage, give it that strength. The only way China will roll back its aggression is if India begins exacting mounting costs that make its territorial gains unbeneficial to hold.

The costs India has sought to impose thus far have proved woefully inadequate to make Beijing end its aggression. A calibrated imposition of progressively escalating costs has become imperative. Without such a course, China could not only escape scot-free but also reap rewards of aggression and become a bigger threat.

Brahma Chellaney, Nikkei Asian Review. Perhaps the only time since the end of World War II that one state has laid claim to territory that can only be accessed via another country, China has sought to simultaneously advance its designs against Bhutan and India. Admiral Philip Davidson warned in before taking over as the U. Attempts to placate Beijing also tend to backfire.

There is a cautionary tale for Japan here. After its disastrous invasion of Vietnam, China developed a strategy of winning without fighting. Deception, concealment and surprise have driven its bulletless aggressions, from seizing Johnson Reef in and Mischief Reef in , to occupying the Scarborough Shoal in Japan, too, has spent years being on the defensive and must come out of its reactive and pacifist mode to safeguard its long-term security.

A more secure Japan will also help underpin peace in the Indo-Pacific region. Today, Japan needs to deal with a more immediate challenge. Once the China-set suspension of fishing around the Senkaku Islands ends on August 16, Chinese provocations could escalate, with the possible entry of many Chinese fishing boats and Coast Guard ships.

As the world struggles to cope with the COVID pandemic, which first emerged in China, Chinese President Xi Jinping is pursuing his quest for regional dominance more aggressively than ever. The parallels between Xi and the despots of the past are obvious. For starters, Xi has cultivated a Mao-style personality cult. Its annexation of resource-rich Tibet, in particular, represented one of the most far-reaching geopolitical developments in post-World War II history, not least because it gave China common borders with India, Nepal, Bhutan, and northernmost Myanmar.

China cannot claim the five fingers on the basis of any Han-Chinese connection. Chinese current claims are nothing more than a power and resource grab. Brahma Chellaney , The Hindustan Times. If the current India-China military disengagement ends up like the Doklam disengagement in making China the clear winner, an emboldened Xi regime will likely become a greater threat to neighbours.

China has displayed its art of deception even in its disengagement process with India. India and China are now in their third disengagement series. But while the previous two abortive rounds followed military-level talks, the latest cycle is being driven politically. Barely 48 hours after his visit, India and China hammered out a disengagement deal. Will the latest deal stick? Removing the threat of an Indian counteroffensive or Indian tit-for-tat land grab will help China win without fighting.

This explains why China has accepted disengagement — but on its terms. The risk that, like at Doklam, the current disengagement may not end well for India is high. Instead of demonstrating strength and resolve, India has displayed zeal to end the stand-off, despite its armed forces being mobilised for possible war. At a time when the international environment is beginning to turn against China, India could have prolonged the stand-off until winter to compel restoration of status quo ante.

But instead, it has kicked status quo ante down the road and settled merely for disengagement. Far from imposing military costs, India has shied away even from trade actions against the aggressor, as if to preserve the option of another Modi-Xi summit. In , a weak India, while recovering from the and wars, gave China a bloody nose.

Its decision-makers remain loath to fundamentally change the China policy even when faced with aggression. When political calculations trump military factors and a nation lives by empty rhetoric, it can win neither war nor peace. If India wants Himalayan peace, it must make China pay for its aggression to help create a deterrent effect. The present aggression — the most serious since the s — resulted from India letting China off the hook too easily in , allowing it to capture Doklam.

And if China emerges the winner from the current crisis, its next aggression could be worse. Only a chastened China saddled with high costs and loss of face will rein in its aggressive expansionism. China has long pursued a broader strategy to corner natural resources. These activities range from building cascades of large dams on international rivers before they leave Chinese-controlled territory to the denial of or delayed transfer of hydrological data to downstream neighboring countries.

From there, they flow to a dozen countries, including mainland China. Today, China has turned this ecologically -fragile plateau, which it invaded and occupied from to , into the center of its mining and dam-building activities. This action is arming Beijing with increasing leverage over the countries critically dependent on river flows from the Tibetan Plateau. Using a natural-flow data model, the study found that the 11 eleven Chinese mega-dams currently in operation on the Mekong are causing severe drought and devastation downstream.

Yet an undeterred China is building more giant dams on the Mekong just before the river crosses into Southeast Asia. It is not just the Mekong: China is constructing dams on multiple international rivers just before they leave its territory. It made China the neighbor of India, Nepal, and Bhutan. Tibet also remains at the center of the China-India divide, fueling territorial disputes, diplomatic tensions, and feuds over river-water flows. Nearly three years later, the water in the once-pristine Siang has still not fully cleared.

Of that amount, For years, China has been the global leader in dam building. The more dams it builds on international rivers, the greater becomes its capacity to use transboundary waters as a tool of coercive diplomacy against its neighbors. Even India and Pakistan have a water-sharing treaty. Cooperative institutional mechanisms and sustainable resource utilization constitute the building blocks of water peace.

If China does not abandon its current approach in favor of institutionalized cooperation with co-basin states, the prospects for a rules-based order in Asia could perish forever, while the likelihood of downstream countries facing a drier future would increase. Asia will be able to shape water for peace only if China comes on board by embracing transparency and collaboration, centered on water sharing, uninterrupted hydrological-data flow, and dispute-settlement mechanisms.

India is now reaping the bitter fruits of such appeasement.

BETTING ODDS EPSOM DERBY 2021 CHEVROLET

Date: Jan 05, Breaking News. Pictured: Spencer Mandela Nakale. Photo: File. Previous : Drowned man identified. Next : Historic flood reaches Naute Dam. Flood warning issued for lower Orange River Feb 11, This could embolden China to destabilize the Indo-Pacific further, with Taiwan possibly its next direct target. But they also did not take the clear and necessary position that the US must forge a concert of democracies to bring sustained multilateral pressure to bear on China.

After four years of Trump, Biden is right to tout the importance of domestic unity. But a tough line on China is one of the few policy areas behind which Americans can unite. More important, it is the only way to ensure a stable Indo-Pacific and world order.

In this light, the US must take a cautious and prudent approach on Myanmar. Directly or indirectly, the military has always called the shots in Myanmar. Heeding them would be a mistake. More fundamentally, the reversal of democratization in Myanmar is a reminder that democracy is unlikely to take root where authoritarian leaders and institutions remain deeply entrenched.

And, as in the past, the brunt of sanctions would be borne by ordinary citizens, not the generals. This is a realistic scenario. Sanctions are a blunt instrument. Likewise, the US, India, Japan, and others have established close defense ties with communist-ruled Vietnam.

Despite their uneven effectiveness and unpredictable consequences, sanctions have remained a favorite — and grossly overused — instrument of Western diplomacy, especially when dealing with the small kids on the global bloc. Non-Western democracies, in stark contrast, prefer constructive engagement. Sanctions without engagement have never worked.

But within months, Obama embarked on a virtually similar policy, which led to his historic visit to Myanmar in Today, nothing would serve Chinese interests more than new US-led efforts to isolate Myanmar, which serves China as a strategic gateway to the Indian Ocean and important source of natural resources. In fact, renewed sanctions and isolation would likely turn Myanmar into another Chinese satellite, like Laos, Cambodia, and Pakistan.

They should perhaps be most worried by how sanctions have forced Russia to pivot to China, turning two natural competitors into becoming close strategic partners. And China has been the main trade and investment beneficiary of US sanctions against Iran. In this light, the US must take a prudent approach to Myanmar. The US must not turn Myanmar from a partner into a pariah again. Large parts of the world are still reeling from the rampaging spread of the coronavirus, with renewed lockdowns in effect in many places.

With every stricken country focused on tackling its COVID crisis, there is little international generosity in donating large quantities of medicines or vaccines when demand for them is sky-high. So, when India in recent days delivered millions of COVID vaccines as gifts to countries in the Indian Ocean region, it attracted international attention.

More than five million Indian-made vaccines were airlifted last week to countries extending from Myanmar and Bangladesh to Mauritius and the Seychelles. And millions of more free vaccines are on their way this week. No other country has delivered millions of free vaccines to other nations — not even China, which has pursued its own vaccine diplomacy in a bid to repair the damage to its global image from the spread of the deadly coronavirus from Chinese soil.

Supplying free vaccines to combat a raging pandemic also seems a better choice for New Delhi than providing direct aid in another form. Now it is leveraging that manufacturing heft by embarking on what has been billed as humanitarian diplomacy — the supply of free vaccines to countries in its extended neighborhood. Its extensive vaccine-manufacturing infrastructure also explains why India, as research by Fitch Solutions suggests, will be able to inoculate most of its vulnerable citizens such as health-care workers and the elderly by mid — ahead of the much-smaller South Korea, for example.

India is currently manufacturing two vaccines — the AstraZeneca-Oxford vaccine, known in India as Covishield, and Covaxin, developed by the Indian pharmaceutical firm Bharat Biotech. Three other Indian companies are close to wrapping up development of their own vaccines. This large stockpile has meant that India has enough vaccines to share with other countries. Daily new cases in India — a distant second to the United States in aggregate infections — have dramatically declined since last fall.

Since the pandemic began, India has quietly donated or commercially exported crucial items that have encountered massive demand surges, such as COVID test kits, personal protection equipment and medicines for coronavirus symptoms. China, while exploiting its pharmaceutical clout for commercial ends throughout the pandemic, has thus far announced only modest vaccine donations.

Indeed, Brazil has turned to India, importing two million vaccines in recent days. As more than , war-ready Indian and Chinese troops remain locked in a months-long Himalayan military standoff, India feels increasingly hemmed in by the expanding Chinese influence in its neighborhood.

India needs to do a lot more on a sustained basis. This demands it shed its intrinsic diffidence in favor of proactive diplomacy. In fact, there is the question of whether India will bear the financial burden of supplying more free coronavirus vaccines to neighboring countries beyond the initial shipments. As with the shots against many other diseases, from polio and pneumonia to meningitis and measles, India is likely to be the largest and most-affordable source of COVID vaccines, especially as new inoculation candidates enter into Indian production after approval.

Brahma Chellaney , World Politics Review. President Joe Biden faces a slew of important foreign policy challenges. But with India, he has a historic opportunity to forge a strategic alliance to help build a stable balance of power in Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific region. India has been a bright spot in U. Not surprisingly, there is strong bipartisan support in both Washington and New Delhi for a closer partnership under Biden. The framework underlines the U. India, shedding its earlier hesitation, has also elevated its involvement in the Quad, a coalition of democracies with Australia, Japan and the U.

Before this paradigm shift, successive U. Against this background, U. Biden has yet to clearly enunciate his approach toward Beijing or his overall Asia policy. Biden, however, has done well to name the veteran Asia hand Kurt Campbell to the newly created position of Indo-Pacific coordinator on the National Security Council. A softer U. Given the bipartisan U. A decision to restore U. But Biden has pledged a renewed U. Critics have branded that law anti-Muslim. However, Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris, whose mother was Indian, are likely to pursue a pragmatic approach that prioritizes deeper engagement with India.

This will include clinching a much-sought-after trade deal with India, whose huge market is an increasingly powerful magnet for U. Brahma Chellaney, Open magazine. At 78, Joe Biden is the oldest president in US history to assume office. Biden has come to power with about one-third of the American voters believing he stole the election, with the US Congress almost evenly divided between the two parties, and with America reeling from the rampaging spread of the coronavirus.

An expansionist China is injecting greater instability and tensions in the Indo-Pacific through its territorial and maritime revisionism and heavy-handed use of economic and military power. Indeed, Trump left office refusing to concede the election. He repeatedly alleged that the election was marred by fraud and irregularities and thus illegitimate.

A partisan national media served as an echo chamber for the Russia-collusion story. Today, the base of the Republican Party reveres Trump even in defeat. Biden has talked about unifying a divided America. But he has taken little concrete action thus far in that direction. After being kicked off US servers, Parler has been forced to turn to a Russian firm that routes internet traffic.

The US is being torn apart by hyper-partisan politics. Tolerance for opposing views is increasingly in short supply. In this environment, fake news, conspiracy theories, fear-mongering and alternative narratives thrive. What keeps the US strong, though, is institutional resilience.

Yet, there is a high risk that, like his predecessor, Biden in office could become an increasingly polarising figure, with Americans either loving or loathing him. Indeed, during the presidential election campaign, Biden made a habit of reversing his positions on major policy issues. Flip-flops are to Biden what egomania was to Trump as president. Biden says he intends to reshape US foreign policy, including by shoring up alliances and by rejoining the Paris climate accord and the World Health Organization.

But his itch to withdraw US forces from Afghanistan led him to cut a deal with the terrorist Taliban, handing Pakistan a major victory. Biden has promised to pursue a more predictable and multilateral approach and to help unite allies in concerted action on issues ranging from climate change to Russia and China.

Biden made the election a referendum on the incumbent rather than a choice. Yet, without having a political base or articulating a clear vision, Biden won. In victory, the Democrats are trying to figure out what they stand for as a party.

But the division between progressives and establishment forces runs deep in the party. It was the liberal interventionists who, under President Barack Obama, engineered the disastrous interventions in Libya and Syria and who, during the Bill Clinton presidency, spearheaded the NATO air war against Yugoslavia.

On China, however, the otherwise hawkish Sullivan has been an advocate of a conciliatory approach. That divide obscures a course between these extremes—one that is not premised on Chinese capitulation or on U. In essence, the essay implicitly sought a G2-style condominium defined by competitive-cum-cooperative elements, with the rest of the world having to adjust to it. The essay actually stood out for failing to look ahead. It listed four hot spots in the Indo-Pacific region but not the Himalayas, now the most dangerous flashpoint.

If anything, the essay reflected the Kissingerian thinking still prevailing in some US policy circles. Biden is unlike the four most recent US presidents: He has deep ties to the Washington establishment, including the lobbying industry, from his 44 years in the Senate and as vice president. No sooner had the media declared him the election winner than he named at least 40 current and former registered lobbyists to his transition team.

But US policy, including sanctions against Russia, have brought two natural strategic competitors into ever-closer alignment. More fundamentally, an interventionist foreign policy under Biden on issues other than China will raise concerns over the renewed influence of the so-called US deep state, which is centred in security and intelligence agencies.

Many Republicans believed the deep state worked hard to topple Trump from power. The imperative in the Indo-Pacific is to build a new strategic equilibrium pivoted on a stable balance of power. A constellation of likeminded countries linked by interlocking strategic cooperation has become critical to help build such equilibrium.

The Indo-Pacific strategy and China policy he adopts will be among his most-consequential foreign policy decisions. On China, Biden has shown a striking lack of strategic clarity thus far. Come on, man. But guess what? In stark contrast, Trump repeatedly pledged during his successful presidential campaign in to fundamentally change the relationship with China.

After assuming office, Trump quickly abandoned the approach of his predecessors, from Richard Nixon to Obama, that aided the rise of China, including as a trade leviathan. How did this blunder occur? Of all the actions of the Trump administration, the one that stung Beijing the most was the unremitting US offensive against China as a predatory state controlled by the CCP without any political legitimacy or rule of law.

This ideological onslaught implied that regime change was essential for China to abide by international norms and rules. Will Biden radically shift the Trump administration policy and treat China as a major competitor but not an implacable enemy, while also abandoning economic decoupling? Such a climbdown would mean a significant dilution of the US strategy to contain China, including reining in the relentless expansionism it pursues without regard to the diplomatic or geopolitical fallout.

How will seeking shared leadership justify the united democratic front on China that Biden wishes to build? It is critical issues like these that have injected a layer of uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific landscape following the leadership change in the White House. It has also put its propaganda machinery in overdrive. What explains this? The pressure that the Trump administration ramped up on China has exacted a heavy toll on Beijing, denting its international image.

Negative views of China reached historic highs in More significantly, it started saying that, once the Biden administration took office, the US and China must come to terms with each other by opening dialogue.

The truth is that the Trump administration ramped up pressure on China by resurrecting the Quad and giving it concrete shape. Trump may have weakened the trans-Atlantic alliance but, in the Indo-Pacific, his administration built the Quad into a promising coalition and upgraded security ties with key partners, including Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and Thailand. It also established new US defence cooperation with Vietnam and the Maldives. Biden wants to build a coalition of democracies to exert pressure on China.

But this is exactly what the Trump administration sought to do. The Quad is an alliance of leading democracies of the Indo-Pacific. The Trump administration committed to establishing a concert of democracies, with India serving as the western anchor and Japan and Australia the eastern and southern anchors of an Indo-Pacific balance of power.

This led even distant powers like France, Germany and Britain to view a pluralistic, rules-based Indo-Pacific as central to international security and to unveil their own Indo-Pacific policies. Important democracies today are looking to Biden to provide strategic clarity on his approach to the Indo-Pacific. The summit would represent a values-based, globalised approach standing in sharp contrast to the Trump administration strategy of regionally leveraging cooperation with democracies for geopolitical ends.

In reality, the Trump administration has bequeathed important leverage to the Biden team to capitalise on and deal with Beijing from a position of strength. It will also lead to questions about the inherent unpredictability surrounding US strategy and the wisdom of investing in closer strategic bonds with Washington in the first place.

Furthermore, it is uncertain whether the Trump administration-initiated ideological offensive against the CCP as a threat to the Indo-Pacific and the wider world will survive under Biden. Will Biden be able to build on that momentum in bilateral relations and formalise a soft alliance with New Delhi?

The Chinese territorial aggression in the Himalayas has created a significant opening for Washington to bring India along. Beijing has also hung the threat of further military surprises, even as it deepens its strategic nexus with Pakistan to contain India. India henceforth will have to patrol the Himalayan frontier in a manpower-intensive way and raise additional mountain-warfare forces to help counter the growing Chinese threat.

India remains committed to strengthening strategic partnerships with key powers in the Indo-Pacific. After all, the other Quad members—the US, Japan and Australia—are already tied by bilateral and trilateral security alliances among themselves. If that happens, it would convince Indian policymakers to step up military modernisation so that India not only effectively counters Chinese threats and aggression but also starts imposing significant deterrent costs on Beijing.

In any event, security across the Indo-Pacific, including US strategic interests, would benefit if India reinvented itself as a more secure and competitive nation. Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including the award-winning Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis. But regional powers — beginning with India and increasingly supported by the US and other Western powers — are pushing back, implying that Chinese President Xi Jinping will live to regret the decisions of Nowhere is this more apparent than in its relations with India.

The shift began in May. As the brutal Himalayan winter receded, a shocked India found that Chinese forces had occupied hundreds of square kilometers of borderlands in its northernmost Ladakh region. In the previous six years, Modi had met with Chinese President Xi Jinping 18 times, in the hope of fostering friendlier relations and weakening the China-Pakistan axis.

Chinese encroachments culminated in the Himalayan border war, which began with a surprise PLA attack and ended with territorial losses for India. Already, India has matched Chinese troop deployments along the frontier and occupied strategic positions in the area. The heightened tensions have triggered a series of clashes, the worst of which left 20 Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of PLA troops dead in mid-June.

In fact, a major Indian military buildup is in the cards. This will include vastly increased frontier patrols and additional mountain-warfare forces. This portends substantial Indian investment in military modernization. But India is not confronting China alone. The terms of the agreement had been under negotiation for more than a decade. Beyond working with likeminded states, diplomatically and militarily, India is attempting to counter China by exposing its neocolonial activities, such as the Belt and Road Initiative.

Now that India recognizes the folly of relying on China for critical supplies, this is bound to change. Fortunately, regional powers — beginning with India — are pushing back. With this regional resistance increasingly supported by the US and other Western powers, Xi will most likely live to regret the decisions he made in Brahma Chellaney, The Times of India. It mandates sanctions against Chinese officials interfering in such processes. India already received a wake-up call in April-May when China stealthily grabbed key vantage points in Ladakh and then claimed, as in the Galwan Valley case, that they were historically part of Tibet.

Tibet is clearly at the centr e of the China-India divide. And TPSA holds special significance for India, which gave refuge to the Dalai Lama and his followers, helped preserve the Tibetan language and culture, and kept the spirit of Tibetan independence alive.

On Aug. Today, China is claiming Indian areas on the basis of not any Han-Chinese connection to them but alleged Tibetan ecclesial or tutelary links. China has no legal standing to press India for compliance when its actions have knowingly gutted the accord, rendering it invalid in international law. While the Tibetans pray for the long life of the present Dalai Lama, Xi is waiting impatiently for him to die so that he can install a puppet as his successor, in the way China has captured the Panchen Lama institution.

To frustrate his plan, India should tacitly help Tibetan exiles find, appoint and protect his successor. India must get its act together to help advance its interests. India could appoint a special emissary on Tibet by stating that, although Tibet has ceased to be a political buffer with China, it should become a political bridge between the two countries. By cautiously recalibrating its Tibet policy, India can help elevate Tibet as an international strategic and environmental issue.

Brahma Chellaney , The National. Researchers believe that the impact of the pandemic has set in motion higher rates of birth, divorce, obesity, depression, bankruptcy, unemployment and domestic violence, among other things. But one key implication of the pandemic has received little attention: increasing demand for safe water. Freshwater is not just the basis of cleanliness; it is an indispensable weapon in combating Covid or any other disease.

More fundamentally, water is essential for economic growth and social stability. Even before the pandemic flared, our water crisis was becoming more acute. Most striking is how unevenly and unequally water resources are distributed across the world. Some countries, notably Canada and Russia, are endowed with copious water resources. The poorest states in water resources, by contrast, are largely located in Middle East and North Africa. Natural water availability in these countries is just a fraction of 1 per cent of the per capita resources in, say, water-rich Brazil.

Water scarcity, already affecting two-thirds of the global population, is set is grow due to several factors. These include over-exploitation of the resources of rivers, aquifers and lakes; rising demands of economic development; changing diets, especially the increasing intake of meat, whose production is notoriously water-intensive; and global warming. National paucity of water resources is driving some countries or companies to produce food for their home markets on overseas farmland, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.

Riparian neighbours are increasingly competing to appropriate resources of shared rivers and aquifers by building hydro-engineering structures, which are exacerbating the environmental impact. A report reflecting the joint judgment of US intelligence agencies warned in that the use of water as a weapon or a tool of terrorism will become more likely in some regions, with some countries using shared water resources to exert leverage over their neighbours and to secure regional influence.

Since then, the water situation has become more dire and the hydropolitics murkier. Another trend is the increasing commodification of water, as reflected in the dramatic rise of the bottled-water industry. And second, bottled mineral water is already more precious than crude oil.

The current international spot price of crude oil is lower than the retail price of any mineral water in a convenience store or supermarket. Yet more and more people are relying on bottled water even in cities in the developed world where tap water is safe and highly regulated. The pandemic, though, may have helped raise global awareness about the centrality of water in our lives. But the pandemic has also underlined the challenge: how to meet the increasing demand for water?

Scientific advancements have substantially improved the energy-water ratio of such technologies, thus increasing the commercial feasibility and attraction of utilising new supply sources. The sharpening hydropolitics, meanwhile, represents a formidable challenge. There is no alternative to rules-based co-operation on shared water resources. Transparency on national projects, collaboration between co-riparian states on trans-boundary aquifers, rivers and lakes, sharing arrangements, and dispute-settlement mechanisms are the building blocks of water peace.

The consequences have been serious. Meanwhile, in largely arid Central Asia, China has diverted waters from the Illy and Irtysh rivers, which originate in China-annexed Xinjiang. With the Brahmaputra megaproject, China has provided an answer. China will achieve this by harnessing the power of a 2,meter 3,yard drop just before the river crosses into India.

But the megaproject in the Brahmaputra Canyon region will enable the country to manipulate transboundary flows far more effectively. In fact, the canyon region is sacred territory for Tibetans: its major mountains, cliffs, and caves represent the body of their guardian deity, the goddess Dorje Pagmo, and the Brahmaputra represents her spine.

If none of this deters China, the damage it is doing to its own people and prospects should. If the Brahmaputra mega-dam collapses — hardly implausible, given that it will be built in a seismically active area — millions downstream could die. Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe this will happen.

On the contrary, as long as the Communist Party of China remains in power, the country will most likely continue to wage stealthy water wars that no one can win. Brahma Chellaney, The Japan Times. President-elect Joe Biden has been wrong on China almost his entire career.

Will he finally get it right after being sworn in as president? It is no exaggeration to say that international policy toward China has for decades been shaped largely by one power — the United States. And other countries followed the American lead in outsourcing manufacturing to China and building closer bonds with that communist giant. In a major speech on China in July , U. Trump himself has acknowledged that the U.

The U. The year will be remembered for the China-inspired COVID shock, with the dictatorship in Beijing seeking to capitalize on the pandemic. Consequently, negative views of China have reached historic highs in many countries, according to a recent survey. Biden is assuming office at a time when an international pushback against China is clearly emerging.

A number of important economies are now seeking a managed and selective decoupling from China in key areas. But if Biden proves a weak president, the pushback will ease — and the decoupling will slow. Could Biden return to the softer approach toward China of the Obama period? The same model Xi is now seeking to replicate in the East China Sea and the Himalayas, where China remains locked in a military standoff with India since May after encroaching on some Indian border areas.

Both concepts imply a G2-style condominium. But make no mistake: A U. But, in apparent deference to China, the Biden office readout left out that assurance. In another worrying sign, Steve Ricchetti, who led the effort 21 years ago to get China into the WTO an entry that has come back to haunt the U. In an interview this month, Biden surprisingly claimed that the U. Such delay in crafting a strategy could help relieve pressure on Beijing. Such an approach will militate against the current U.

There is an additional factor that could constrain Biden from going soft on China — a lingering scandal involving his controversial son, Hunter. Hunter personally made millions of dollars from the deal. Republicans could resurrect that scandal to embarrass Biden. China has long used U. Wall Street remains its powerful ally. China also has another ally in Washington — those who remain mired in Cold War thinking and see Russia as the main foe.

Without U. This is why Biden must at the earliest provide strategic clarity to his China approach. Brahma Chellaney, a longtime contributor to The Japan Times, is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including, most recently, Water, Peace, and War.

In a major speech on China in July, U. Now, people of good faith can debate why free nations allowed these bad things to happen for all these years. And President Trump has said: enough. I blame all of our presidents, and not just President Obama.

You go back a long way. You look at President Clinton, Bush — everybody; they allowed this to happen, they created a monster. Chinese territorial aggression in the Himalayas has been a huge boon for American efforts to win over India, as highlighted by a recent agreement to share geospatial data from airborne and satellite sensors. After establishing an Indo-Pacific strategy and resurrecting the Quad, which had been lying dormant for nine years, the Trump administration — in a symbolic nod toward India — renamed the U.

In the recent words of U. As the U. Will the administration of Joe Biden return to the softer approach toward China of the Obama period? The same model China has sought to replicate in the Himalayas, by incrementally encroaching on the territories of India, Nepal and Bhutan.

That strategy has relied on the Quad. Under Biden, the fundamental direction of the U. But Biden could reset ties with China in order to lower Sino-U. The open support the U. For example, after the Galwan Valley clashes of mid-June, U. They beat 20 Indians to death. They beat them so badly with clubs with nails in them and wrapped with concertina wire — barbed wire.

They beat the Indians so badly that they were disfigured and could not be identified by their comrades. The Chinese have been very aggressive with India. I think you need to put it in the larger context. Claims that they have now made for real estate in Bhutan, the incursions that took place in India, these are indicative of Chinese intentions.

And they are testing, they are probing the world to see if we are going to stand up to their threats and their bullying. Such plain speaking may become a thing of the past. That divide obscures a course between these extremes — one that is not premised on Chinese capitulation or on U. Both concepts imply a G2-style condominium defined by competitive-cum-cooperative elements. This is a country increasingly oriented to the primacy of the Communist Party.

What is remarkable — and a cause for deep concern — is that Biden has been wrong on China virtually his entire career. But just when a concert of democracies in the Indo-Pacific seems closer than ever, the impending change of U. Rarely has the U. After the U. Today, a rules-based and democracy-led order in the Indo-Pacific has become more important than ever to ensure a stable power balance. It will also lead to questions about the inherent unpredictability surrounding U.

Nowhere will these questions generate greater concerns than in India, which hosted the recent Malabar war games. More broadly, it could be viewed as a possible dilution of the U. But India now faces new uncertainties with regard to U. Few know what Biden stands for. Biden, who turned 78 last month, will be the oldest ever American president sworn in for the first time.

Biden won the election despite having no political base or vision — and no ideas, other than to oust Trump from office. Today, the U. If as president, Biden seeks to mend U. India, however, is likely to remain important for the U. This geopolitical reality, if left unaddressed, could crimp U. Negative views of China have now reached historic highs in many countries, according to a survey by the Washington-based Pew Research Center.

If Biden proves a weak president, the pushback will certainly ease — and the decoupling could slow. Such an approach will militate against the current bipartisan consensus on China in the U. Kennan the founding director of its Policy Planning Staff that helped institute the containment policy against the Soviet Union — a policy that defined the Cold War era. It specifies a multipronged approach to address the China challenge.

For New Delhi, the key concern extends beyond the bilateral relationship with Washington — a relationship that is likely to remain close. Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including, most recently, Water, Peace, and War. In a world wracked by violence, Islamist beheadings stand out for their savagery.

In a world wracked by violence, such killings stand out for their savagery. While the absolute number of victims is relatively small, the threat this practice poses to fundamental principles of modern civilization should not be underestimated. Such savagery casts a long shadow — especially because perpetrators so often share images of their actions. The gruesome spectacle inspires jihadi sympathizers around the world, while fomenting fear in local communities, to the point that the Islamists are often able to impose their will — including medieval codes of conduct — on the societies in which they operate.

But, by making clear their willingness to behave inhumanely, they have ensured that few dare defy them. Through such tactics, Islamists are gradually snuffing out more liberal, diverse Islamic traditions in non-Arab countries.

Although beheadings have a particularly visceral impact, they are far from the only way the jihadists incite fear. Even within Western countries, meaningful government action against Islamist extremism has often been stymied by concerns about discrimination. In the last few years, China has incarcerated more than one million Uighurs and members of other Muslim minorities in its western Xinjiang region.

It is clearly far easier to attack a democracy than to stand up to a ruthless dictatorship. But none of this will protect Muslim communities, let alone end Islamist terrorism. For that, governments must adopt a new approach, based on a better understanding of the enemy they are fighting. Islamist extremism is not an organization or an army; it is an ideological movement. That is why eliminating high-level figures in ISIS or al-Qaeda does so little to stop the bloodshed, and why military action alone will always fall short.

It also means taming the clerics and other preachers of violent jihad. Otherwise, the war on terror will continue to rage, and violent Islamism will become more deeply entrenched in societies. Brahma Chellaney , Nikkei Asia. The current naval war games involving Australia, India, Japan and the U. A concert of democracies in the Indo-Pacific seems closer than ever. But just when the four powers appear on the cusp of formalizing their coalition, the impending change in the White House has added a layer of uncertainty.

Trump fundamentally changed U. Nowhere will these questions generate greater concerns than in India, the host of the current Quad naval war games up to Nov. Handout photo from U. Chinese territorial aggression in the Himalayas has helped bring India along. This would mark a break with the current approach that sees the U. To be sure, Biden made a habit during the election campaign of reversing his positions on major policy issues.

Flip-flops are to Biden what egomania is to Trump. And, in apparent deference to Beijing, the Biden office readout left out the assurance Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga said he received from the president-elect that U. The bipartisan consensus in Washington that the U. Unless a clearer strategic vision emerges under Biden, the likely unraveling of the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy could silence any hoped-for regional concert of democracies.

Foreign Affairs journal. President-elect Joe Biden will inherit a U. Will the bilateral relationship continue to deepen under the next U. In the past decade, Washington and New Delhi have deepened their diplomatic and defense ties, but the Indian government has not yet officially allied with the United States. During the administration of U. President Donald Trump, India and the United States signed a series of foundational defense, logistics, and intelligence-sharing agreements that pave the way for close security cooperation.

Last month, the then U. As the specter of additional Himalayan battles—or even a reprise of the border war with China—looms large, India has grown more willing to work with the United States to meet common challenges. Biden is likely to continue to push for closer cooperation between New Delhi and Washington.

Beijing seized key stretches of territory and has refused to pull back, alarming both Indian policymakers and the public at large. Given these tensions, Biden will have to thread a diplomatic needle to improve relations with China without alienating India. Successive U. New Delhi would be disappointed if Biden, in seeking to mend U. India has traditionally resented such interference in and commentary on its internal affairs. Congress last December after it emerged that Representative Pramila Jayapal, an outspoken critic of the Modi government, would attend.

Such differences have the potential to set back U. The incoming president, more broadly, is likely to pursue a pragmatic policy aimed at containing the threats posed by both the Chinese Communist Party and violent Islamist extremists. Current U. In that context, the strengthening bond with India assumes greater meaning for U. Even as he tries to lower tensions with China, Biden must be careful not to allow the historic opportunity to forge a U.

Sri Lanka and Pakistan, meanwhile, are taking fresh loans from China to pay off old loans, highlighting the vicious cycle in which they find themselves trapped. Both have already been compelled to cede strategic assets to China. Pakistan has given China exclusive rights, coupled with a tax holiday, to run Gwadar port for the next 40 years.

Next to the port, which is located at the crossroads of the global energy trade, China plans to build a Djibouti-style outpost for its navy. Tajikistan, whose borrowing binge from was followed by its ceding of 1, sq. Another country heavily in debt to China, neighboring Kyrgyzstan, also sought relief from Beijing last month before it plunged into political chaos.

In Africa, a long list of states wanting suspension of their debt repayments to Beijing during the coronavirus pandemic includes Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique and Zambia. So, it agreed to give deep-pocketed Chinese state-run companies an important role in harnessing its rich hydropower reserves.

The answer is several factors, including the comparative ease of borrowing from China, with IMF lending normally carrying stringent conditions and oversight. Indeed, China is happy to lend until nations face a debt crisis because of the greater leverage it gives Beijing. Typically, China starts as an economic partner of another country, only to gradually become its economic master. China has a record of exploiting the vulnerability of small, strategically located countries that borrow big.

One such example is the Maldives, where Beijing converted big credits into political influence, including acquiring a couple of islets cheaply in that Indian Ocean archipelago. Unlike some other heavily indebted states, the Maldives has been lucky to escape a Chinese debt trap. But the wider pushback against its imperial overreach, coupled with the corruption and malpractice in many of its Belt and Road projects, suggests that Beijing could be securing near-term advantages at the expense of its long-term goals.

Negative views of China have reached historic highs this year. The rising public distrust of China even in partner countries, and the fact that many Belt and Road projects are still not financially viable, have resulted in a declining number of new projects. Cumulatively, China is likely to pay a high price for its debt-trap diplomacy, even as the states it has ensnared are bound to suffer. Brahma Chellaney , Project Syndicate. China represents a growing challenge to all these principles.

While all of the Quad partners agree in principle on the need for a free and open Indo-Pacific, it is Chinese expansionism that has catalyzed their recent actions. China is forcing even distant powers like the United Kingdom, France, and Germany to view a rules-based Indo-Pacific as central to international peace and security. These developments suggest that in the coming years, Quad members will increasingly work with European partners to establish a strategic constellation of democracies capable of providing stability and an equilibrium of power in the Indo-Pacific.

After lying dormant for nine years, the Quad was resurrected in late , but really only gained momentum over the last year, when its consultations were elevated to the foreign-minister level. Australia and Japan are both under the US security and nuclear umbrella, whereas India not only shares a large land border with China, but also must confront Chinese territorial aggression on its own, as it is currently doing.

It is precisely this aggression that has changed the strategic equation. It is now more likely than ever that the Quad will shift gears from consultation and coordination to become a de facto strategic alliance that plays a central role in a new multilateral security arrangement for the region. Most likely, this meeting will conclude with India signing on to the last of the four foundational agreements that the US maintains with its other close defense partners.

US foreign policy has always been most effective when it leverages cooperation with other countries to advance shared strategic objectives. But that day is coming. The Quad once merely symbolized an emerging international effort to establish a discreet check on Chinese power. The extended standoff has certainly raised the risks of further localized battles or another full-scale border war.

The Tibetan frontier with India was largely peaceful for centuries before China occupied Tibet in Under Xi, China has introduced measures to snuff out Tibetan culture and cut Tibetans off from ancient traditions, including herding and farming. Recent reports have shed light on a coerced labor program to forcibly assimilate Tibetans, including through military drill-style skills training. China has also forced the last remaining Tibetan-language school to teach in Chinese.

India, however, has been funding Tibetan-language schools for its large Tibetan refugee community. Tibetan children study at a school in the northern Indian hill town of Dharamsala. Underscoring the sharpening geopolitics, the U. This explains why China has intensified its claim to Tawang, the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama. Even more humiliating for Beijing is the fact that the Indian operation was spearheaded by a special force made up entirely of Tibetan exiles.

India rubbed salt in the wound by holding a largely-attended military funeral for a Tibetan soldier killed in that operation, with his coffin draped in both the Indian and Tibetan national flags. The itch to fight the occupiers of their homeland has drawn Tibetan recruits to this force. But his aggression against India may not be progressing as planned. China, however, is unwilling to curb its economic and territorial expansionism.

In fact, Xi continues to push the boundaries, as underscored by the multiple fronts he has opened simultaneously, including in the East and South China seas, the Himalayan frontier, Hong Kong and Taiwan. We have no intention to fight either a cold war or a hot war with any country. We will continue to narrow differences and resolve disputes with others through dialogue and negotiation.

There are important parallels between the way China is pursuing its territorial revisionism against its two main rivals in Asia, Japan and India. Indeed, China is pursuing a strategy of attrition and containment against both. In international law, a territorial claim must be based on continuous and peaceful exercise of sovereignty over the territory concerned.

There is absolutely no evidence that China ever had effective control over, for example, the Senkaku Islands. Sinicizing the names of territories it claims is an old tactic of the Chinese Communist Party. In recent months, China has sought to even police the waters off the Senkakus.

If history is not to be repeated, Suga should draw some lessons, including from the record of his predecessor, Shinzo Abe. Consider the startling fact that no Japanese defense minister has ever conducted an aerial survey of the Senkakus. Such shrinking from purely defensive action explains why an emboldened China has stepped up incursions. Japan needs to strengthen its administrative and security control over the Senkakus.

This approach involves taking an adversary by surprise, including seizing an opportunistic timing, and camouflaging offense as defense. China persists with its recklessly provocative actions, including ignoring the risk that an incident could spiral out of control.

A fourth lesson is that as long as China perceives strategic benefits as outweighing costs, Xi will persist with his strategy of attrition against Japan. Against this background, a Chinese strike against the Senkaku Islands could conceivably come when Japan has been lulled into complacency and least expects an attack.

This is what happened to India. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not see the Chinese aggression coming because his vision had been clouded by the naive hope that, by meeting Xi 18 times in about five years, he had reset the bilateral relationship. Despite the Suga-Xi understanding, Chinese provocations could escalate.

Japan has spent years being on the defensive, allowing China to keep the initiative. Japan ought to look at ways to impose costs. This could include first warning Beijing that its provocative actions, such as chasing Japanese fishing vessels within Japanese territorial waters, would henceforth be firmly countered.

If provocative actions persist despite the warning, the Japan Coast Guard could selectively act against some intruding Chinese state ships. To be sure, effectively countering Chinese incursions demands more than ramming or disabling intruding ships and detaining their crews. Japan could begin modestly by building an environmental monitoring station in the Senkakus. China, of course, will react furiously to any Japanese counteractions. If not, China will bring Japanese security under increasing pressure in the coming years.

Japan has a strong case, anchored in international law, that it has exercised sovereignty over the Senkakus since But make no mistake: The future of the Senkakus will not be decided by international law, even though a just, rules-based order is essential for international peace and security.

The South China Sea is a reminder that international law is powerless against the powerful. Japan undoubtedly faces hard choices. But accommodation with an unyielding China is simply not possible. To stop its security from coming under siege, Japan must act — with calm, confidence and firmness. But by provoking India, he may have bitten off more than he can chew.

Xi, who in some ways has taken up the expansionist mantle of Mao Zedong, is attempting to implement a modern version of the tributary system that Chinese emperors used to establish authority over vassal states: submit to the emperor, and reap the benefits of peace and trade with the empire.

The specter of international isolation and supply disruptions now looms over China, spurring Xi to announce plans to hoard mammoth quantities of mineral resources and agricultural products. India, however, is ready to fight. Xi was so embarrassed by this outcome that, whereas India honored its 20 fallen as martyrs, China refuses to admit its precise death toll. The truth is that, without the element of surprise, China is not equipped to dominate India in a military confrontation.

And India is making sure that it will not be caught off guard again. It has now matched Chinese military deployments along the Himalayan frontier and activated its entire logistics network to transport the supplies needed to sustain the troops and equipment through the coming harsh winter. In another blow to China, Indian special forces recently occupied strategic mountain positions overlooking key Chinese deployments on the southern side of Pangong Lake.

If that were not humiliating enough for China, India eagerly noted that the Special Frontier Force that spearheaded the operation comprises Tibetan refugees. The Tibetan soldier who was killed by a landmine in the operation was honored with a well-attended military funeral. If China is merely occupying Tibet, how can it claim sovereignty over those borderlands? Xi wants neither to back down nor to wage an open war, which is unlikely to yield the decisive victory he needs to restore his reputation after the border debacle.

Given this, a Sino-Indian war in the Himalayas would probably end in a stalemate, with both sides suffering heavy losses. Xi seems to be hoping that he can simply wear India down. At a time when the Indian economy has registered its worst-ever contraction due to the still-escalating COVID crisis, Xi has forced India to divert an increasing share of resources to national defense.

But it seems less likely that India will wilt under Chinese pressure than that Xi will leave behind a legacy of costly blunders. With his Himalayan misadventure, Xi has provoked a powerful adversary and boxed himself into a corner. Those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it. Did India really draw enduring lessons from ?

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Indian cricket betting scandal deepens a waterway Nowhere will these questions soccer betting odds wikipedia greater concerns than in India, which hosted the recent Malabar war games. On the contrary, as long as the Communist Party of China remains in power, the country will most likely continue to wage indian cricket betting scandal deepens a waterway water wars that no one can win. There is absolutely no evidence that China ever had effective control over, for example, the Senkaku Islands. But US policy, including sanctions against Russia, have brought two natural strategic competitors into ever-closer alignment. China is forcing even distant powers like the United Kingdom, France, and Germany to view a rules-based Indo-Pacific as central to international peace and security. Looking ahead, the Tablighi Jamaat will not find it easy to repair the damage to its reputation.
Deportivo vs valencia betting expert tennis For indian cricket betting scandal deepens a waterway, Xi has cultivated a Mao-style personality cult. This ideological onslaught implied that regime change was essential for China to abide by international norms and rules. To be sure, effectively countering Chinese incursions demands more than ramming or disabling intruding ships and detaining their crews. A constellation of likeminded countries linked by interlocking strategic cooperation has become critical to help build such equilibrium. This portends substantial Indian investment in military modernization. More significantly, it started saying that, once the Biden administration took office, the US and China must come to terms with each other by opening dialogue.

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